If proofs exist in a social context, how have they changed over time?<\/strong><\/h3>\nIt all starts with Aristotle. He said that there needs to be some sort of deductive system \u2014 that you can only prove new things by basing them on things you already know and are certain of, going back to certain \u201cprimitive statements,\u201d or axioms.<\/p>\n
So then the question is: What are those basic things that you know to be true? For a very long time, people just said, well, a line is a line, a circle is a circle; there are a few things that are simple and obvious, and those should be the assumptions we start from.<\/p>\n
That perspective has lasted forever. It\u2019s still around today to a large extent. But the Euclidean axiomatic system that developed \u2014 \u201ca line is a line\u201d \u2014 had its problems. There were these paradoxes discovered by Bertrand Russell based on the notion of a set. Moreover, one could play word games with the mathematical language, creating problematic statements like \u201cthis statement is false\u201d (if it\u2019s true, then it\u2019s false; if it\u2019s false, then it\u2019s true) that indicated there were problems with the axiomatic system.<\/p>\n
So Russell and Alfred Whitehead tried to create a new system of doing math that could avoid all these problems. But it was ludicrously complicated, and it was hard to believe that these were the right primitives to start from. Nobody was comfortable with it. Something like proving 2 + 2 = 4 took a vast amount of space from the starting point. What\u2019s the point of such a system?<\/p>\n
Then David Hilbert came along and had this amazing idea: that maybe we shouldn\u2019t be telling anyone what\u2019s the right thing to start with at all. Instead, anything that works \u2014 a starting point that\u2019s simple, coherent and consistent \u2014 is worth exploring. You can\u2019t deduce two things from your axioms that contradict each other, and you should be able to describe most of mathematics in terms of the selected axioms. But you shouldn\u2019t a priori say what they are.<\/p>\n
This, too, seems to fit into our earlier discussion of objective truth in math. So at the turn of the 20th century, mathematicians were realizing that there could be a plurality of axiomatic systems \u2014 that one given set of axioms shouldn\u2019t be taken as a universal or self-evident truth?<\/strong><\/h3>\nRight. And I should say, Hilbert didn\u2019t start off doing this for abstract reasons. He was very interested in different notions of geometry: non-Euclidean geometry. It was very controversial. People at the time were like, if you give me this definition of a line that goes around the corners of a box, why on earth should I listen to you? And Hilbert said that if he could make it coherent and consistent, you should listen, because this may be another geometry that we need to understand. And this change in viewpoint \u2014 that you can allow any axiomatic system \u2014 didn\u2019t just apply to geometry; it applied to all of mathematics.<\/p>\n
But of course, some things are more useful than others. So most of us work with the same 10 axioms, a system called ZFC.<\/p>\n
Which leads to the question of what can and can\u2019t be deduced from it. There are statements, like the continuum hypothesis, which cannot be proved using ZFC. There must be an 11th axiom. And you can resolve it either way, because you can choose your axiomatic system. It\u2019s pretty cool. We continue with this sort of plurality. It\u2019s not clear what\u2019s right, what\u2019s wrong. According to Kurt G\u00f6del, we still need to make choices based on taste, and we hopefully have good taste. We should do things that make sense. And we do.<\/p>\n